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Competition law structures economic entities’ market behaviour. The notion of economic 
entity potentially captures distinct corporate legal persons within a single economic 
enterprise. To the extent that these distinct corporate legal entities present a single entity, 
competition law enforcement profoundly alters in scope. 
 
On the one hand, single entity notions provide a defense for multiple corporate entities to 
avoid antitrust scrutiny. On the other, they embolden competition authorities to impute fines 
for competition law infringements committed by subsidiaries or affiliates to parent or 
otherwise affiliated companies. The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in American Needle seems to 
have curbed enthusiasm for single entity defenses, whereas increasing reliance on parent 
company liability transformed EU single entity claims into powerful prosecutorial devices. 
 
This article explores the conditions to establish successful single entity claims in U.S. 
antitrust and EU competition law. Both legal orders apply similar conceptions of (corporate) 
control and (market) conduct to determine the scope of single entity claims. In so doing, 
control and conduct have been operationalized in different ways, leaving significant gaps or 
inconsistencies in the development of a true single entity test. The juxtaposition of both single 
entity approaches aims to contribute to remedying those inconsistencies. 
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Economic and legal entities do not always coincide for competition law purposes, as 
competition law mainly structures economic entities’ behaviour.1 A single economic entity 
frequently comprises distinct corporate legal persons, jointly contributing to a single 
economic enterprise. To the extent that multiple corporate legal entities present themselves as 
a single economic entity, the scope of competition law enforcement alters in relation to 
interactions within and among those constituent legal entities. This article explores the 
conditions enabling competition law practitioners successfully to establish the claim that 
multiple corporate entities present a single entity for the purposes of competition law. These 
single entity claims will be discussed in light of recent developments in U.S. antitrust and EU 
competition law.2 
 
The single entity concept is inherently double-edged. On the one hand, single entity claims 
exonerate or shield market behaviour from competition law sanctions. On the other, they also 
potentially extend the reach of competition law fines to related legal entities. Reliance on 
single entity claims allows competition authorities to include parent companies or otherwise 
affiliated businesses in the calculation and imputation of competition law penalties directly 
related to subsidiaries’ behaviour. A broad ‘single economic entity’ conception thus enables 
competition authorities to sanction larger entities comprising multiple affiliated corporations.3 
As such, single entity provides a defense for businesses (defensive dimension) and an 
enhanced ‘prosecutorial’ device for competition authorities (prosecutorial dimension).4 
 
                                                 
1
 The notion of corporate legal entity only plays a subordinate role in competition law. U.S. antitrust laws have 
been created to complement corporate laws in regulating market behaviour. More specifically, U.S antitrust laws 
were meant to address coordination and cooperation among businesses, see for an overview in that regard, M. 
Horwitz, The transformation of American law 1870-1960: the crisis of legal orthodoxy (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 80-85. See also H. Hovenkamp, ‘The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of 
Competition’, Iowa Law Review 74 (1989), 1019-1065. A similar argument can be made for EU competition 
law, which is pervaded by the notion of undertaking, as part three of this article will demonstrate. See also W. 
Wils, ‘The undertaking as subject of E.C. competition law and the imputation of infringements to natural or legal 
persons’, E.L.Rev. 25 (2000), 101-102. 
2
 See for an earlier comparative study, G. Assant, ‘Anti-trust intracorporate conspiracies: a comparative study of 
French, EEC and American Laws’, ECLR 11 (1990), 65-79. 
3
 A. Montesa and A. Givaja, ‘When Parents Pay for their Children’s Wrongs: Attribution of Liability for EC 
Antitrust Infringements in Parent-Subsidiary Scenarios’, W. Comp. 29 (2006), 555-574; R. Burnley, ‘Group 
Liability for Antitrust Infringements: Responsibility and Accountability’, W. Comp. 33 (2010), 595-614. 
4
 These functions can also be related to the scope of application and the scope of imputation of competition law 
provisions, see W. Wils, note 1 above, 100. 
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The defensive dimension garnered most attention in U.S. antitrust analysis. EU law also 
considered single entity defenses but recent scholarly and judicial attention there is dominated 
by single entity prosecutions. More particularly, the liability of parent companies for 
competition law infringements of a subsidiary is gaining prominence among EU competition 
law professionals.5 The limits and possibilities of attributing competition law actions to parent 
companies have revitalized long held discussions on the notion of undertaking as a tool to 
enforce EU competition law. 
 
Throughout these different emphases, both legal systems have struggled to develop a nuanced 
and generally applicable single entity framework determining the boundaries of competition 
law enforcement. In so doing, judges have increasingly taken notice of particular economic 
criteria related to control (rights), business interests and market conduct within and among 
different affiliated businesses. In this article, we aim to structure the case law criteria in newly 
proposed U.S. and EU single entity testing frameworks. We highlight that both legal systems 
rely on similar criteria and attach similar (but not entirely equal) weight to different 
conditions of control and conduct. In so doing, we aim to uncover the single entity narratives 
that guide EU and U.S. judges and regulators. More specifically, we aim to provide new ways 
of reflecting upon the EU’s single entity test in light of future refining or convergence 
initiatives.6 
 
The following two parts of this paper elaborate on the different applications of single entity 
claims in U.S. antitrust and EU competition law. We demonstrate that both legal systems rely 
on similar conceptions of control and conduct to define and delineate single entity claims. The 
concrete applications and interrelationships among these conceptions nevertheless differ in 
scope and intensity. The second part sketches the rise of the single entity defense in U.S. 
                                                 
5
 K. Hofstetter and M. Ludescher, ‘Fines against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for 
‘Best Practice Compliance’, W. Comp. 33 (2010), 55-76; A. Riesenkampf and U. Krauthausen, ‘Liability of 
parent companies for antitrust violations of their subsidiaries’, ECLR 31 (2010), 38-41; L. La Rocca, ‘The 
controversial issue of the parent company liability for the violation of EC competition rules by the subsidiary’, 
ECLR. 32 (2011), 73-74; See also references in note 3 above. 
6
 Convergence or divergence tendencies among EU and US competition law systems have been subject to a 
wealth of literature, mainly focusing on extraterritoriality, differences in merger procedures, different approaches 
towards consumer welfare and economic efficiency etc. On differences, see among many others, G. Niels and A. 
Ten Kate, ‘Introduction: antitrust in the U.S. and the EU – converging or diverging paths’, Antitrust Bulletin 49 
(2004), 1-29 for an analysis with respect to mergers. See also C.A. Jones, ‘Foundations of Competition Policy in 
the EU and USA: conflict, convergence and beyond’ in H. Ullrich, The evolution of European competition law. 
Whose regulation, which competition? (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 17-37. For a perspective from a 
‘global level’, see D. Gerber, Global Competition. Law, Markets and Globalization (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010). Emphasizing antitrust convergence from a transatlantic perspective, see the casebook authored by 
E. Elhauge and D. Geradin, Global competition law and economics (Oxford, Hart, 2007). 
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antitrust law and its apparent curtailment in the recent American Needle case. The third part 
analyzes the scope of single entity claims as engrained in the EU’s undertaking concept. It 
distinguishes the defensive dimension from the more recent prosecutorial dimension and 
extracts the scope of EU single entity claims from both dimensions. A concluding fourth part 
argues that the notions of control and conduct require more elaboration in both legal systems 
to enhance the certainty and predictability of single entity tests. Mutual refinement through 
comparing EU and U.S. approaches provides a relevant stepping stone towards developing a 
full-fledged and detailed single entity test in both legal systems. 
 
2. Single entity claims in U.S. antitrust law 
 
This part discusses the state of single entity claims in U.S. antitrust law. Entities subject to 
antitrust investigations often claim that they present a single economic entity to which U.S. 
cartel prohibitions do not apply. Following a general introduction into the analytical 
framework of single entity claims (section 1), we discuss the seminal cases that have 
structured single entity debates over the last century (section 2). We subsequently argue how 
particular readings of these cases triggered the outcome in the 2010 American Needle 
judgment (section 3). That outcome provides a basis for the establishment of a nuanced U.S. 
antitrust single entity test (section 4). 
 
2.1.A matter of degree: the scope of application U.S. antitrust law 
 
The U.S. single entity doctrine provides business units with a defense against the imposition 
of antitrust penalties. Single entity claims aim to identify ‘objective criteria for relieving 
certain types of governance structures from antitrust scrutiny’.7 The notion of single entity 
was most explicitly evinced in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 Copperweld opinion. The 
Supreme Court there held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary 
constituted a single entity. Following divergent case law interpretations on the scope of single 
entity, the Supreme Court revisited and clarified its analysis in the important 2010 American 
Needle judgment. In order to frame both opinions and the underlying theoretical premises 
advocated by the Supreme Court, this section briefly sketches the concept of business unit or 
single entity in the analytical framework of U.S. antitrust law analysis. 
 
                                                 
7
 D. Williamson, ‘Organization, Control and the Single Entity Defense in Antitrust’, Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 5 (2009), 724. 
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The most important provisions related to single entity claims are reflected in the 1890 
Sherman Antitrust Act.8 Section 1 of the Act determines that ‘[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of a trust or otherwise, or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade’ is prohibited. Every 
‘person’ or firm engaging in restraining behaviour shall be subject to criminal and 
administrative penalties.9 Section 1 infringements require at least bilateral action.10 Section 2 
on the other hand prohibits individual ‘persons’ or firms to engage in monopolization.11 
Monopolization transcends the scope of merely entertaining a monopoly. It rather amounts to 
abusing a monopolist market position.12 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, ‘it is not 
enough that a single firm appears to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for even a vigorous 
competitor may leave that impression […] In part because it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-run anti-competitive effects, Congress 
authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single firms only when they pose a danger for 
monopolization’.13 The doctrine of single entity thus determines whether multiple legal 
entities effectively function as one person and therefore cannot conspire in violation of 
Section 1. 
Both sections refer to ‘persons’, but remain silent on the scope of personhood. The other 
provisions of the Sherman Act are also of little help in that respect. As Section 7 states, ‘the 
word ''person'', or ''persons'', wherever used in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed to 
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the 
                                                 
8
 Sherman Antitrust Act, July 2, 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
9
 More specifically, every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy 
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
10
 In a 2003 U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit judgment, Judge Kozinski stated that Section 1, like the 
tango, requires multiplicity. A company cannot conspire with itself, see Freeman v. San Diego Association of 
Realtors, 322 F.3d, 1147; C. Sagers on the other hand argues that the reference to combinations (representing 
affiliated enterprises and joint ventures) calls into question the plurality requirement of Section 1, see C. Sagers, 
‘American Needle, Dagher and the Evolving Antitrust Theory of the Firm: What will become of Section 1?’, 
TheAntitrustSource 2009, 8. On plurality, see also G. Feldman, ‘The Puzzling Persistence of the Single Entity 
Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Reject a Flawed 
Defense’, Wisconsin Law Review (2009), 841. 
11
 It reads that ‘[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 
10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court’. 
12
 See in that regard the 1945 Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in United States v. Aluminum 
Corporation of America (Alcoa), 148 F2.d, 431. For an overview, see H. Hovenkamp, ‘The Monopolization 
Offense’, Ohio State Law Journal 61 (2000), 1035-1049; for a more critical perspective, E. Elhauge, ‘Defining 
Better Monopolization Standards’, Stanford Law Review 56 (2003), 253 – 344. 
13
 U.S. Supreme Court, Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation (1984), 104 S. Ct. 2739 
(hereafter referred to as Copperweld). 
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United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any 
foreign country’. The extent to which multiple corporations present a single person or entity 
remains unclear from that reading. It was left to the courts to decide whether a contract, 
combination or conspiracy was concluded by multiple ‘persons’ or whether multiple 
corporations could constitute a single ‘person’ for antitrust enforcement purposes. 
From that limited textual perspective, single entity claims address the issue ‘whether an 
arrangement is a contract, combination, or conspiracy’14 by assessing whether or not at least 
two ‘persons’ are involved. That issue, according to Justice John Paul Stevens, ‘is different 
from and antecedent to the question whether it unreasonably restrains trade’.15  
Despite this apparent antecedence of ‘personhood’ questions, the courts have never embraced 
a formal distinction between scope of application and restraints of trade analyses. On the 
contrary, judges subjected the single entity question to classical antitrust analysis. The U.S. 
Supreme Court16 has applied a classical antitrust analytical framework to single entity claims. 
That framework distinguishes per se, rule of reason and ‘quick look’ rule of reason analysis. 
For clarity’s sake, we briefly restate these typologies of antitrust analysis, as they are 
determinative in the reconstruction of the U.S. single entity test. 
Judicial analysis has mainly focused on the scope of analysis following which particular 
restraints to competition should be prohibited. Per se prohibitions are distinguished from rule 
of reason analyses. Per se prohibitions present an automatic rule of illegality.17 Activities that 
trigger a per se prohibition are immediately and without conducting a detailed (economic) 
analysis considered to be illegal and prohibited. They are ‘so plainly anticompetitive that no 
elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality’18. Well-known classical 
examples are direct price fixing and direct output limitations through cartels.19 In principle, 
                                                 
14
 U.S. Supreme Court, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2206 (hereafter 
referred to as American Needle). 
15
 American Needle, note 14 above, 2206. 
16
 Hereafter referred to as Supreme Court. 
17
 Automatic illegality was used by B. Jones and J. Turner, ‘The Fall of the Per Se Vertical Price Fixing Rule’, 
Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues 13 (2010), 84. 
18
 U.S. Supreme Court, National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States (1978), 98 S. Ct. 1366 
(hereafter referred to as Engineers). 
19
 Bid rigging could also be included in that list. For a very succinct overview of issues, see S. Adkins, ‘Too 
Much Competition: The Supreme Court Sacks the NFL’s Single Entity Defense 9-0 in American Needle, Inc. v. 
National Football League’, Willamette Sports Law Journal 8 (2011), 25. For a case law overview, see H. 
Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy. The Law of Competition and its Practice (St. Paul, Thomson, 2005), 253-
265, arguing that per se rules are the result of experience, rather than logic. Courts find practices so commonly 
anticompetitive that they do not need to conduct an elaborate analysis to verify anticompetitiveness. 
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per se prohibitions establish conclusive presumptions of illegality; they cannot be rebutted by 
procompetitive justifications adduced by parties to an agreement.20 Per se analysis could also 
exempt particular situations from antitrust scrutiny.21 In those instances, a particular situation 
triggers the non-application of antitrust provisions. Per se prohibitions and exemptions thus 
avoid ‘the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into 
the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to 
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable’.22 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court limits the establishment of per se prohibitions and exemptions to 
exceptional situations. In most instances, the courts prefer a balance among procompetitive 
and anticompetitive arguments in a rule of reason analysis. The rule of reason allows the 
parties to present a balanced argument in which reasonable limitations on competition can be 
justified.23 Attention is paid to the analysis of the ‘facts peculiar to the business, the history of 
the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event, the purpose of the analysis 
is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint’.24 As long as pro-
competitive justifications outweigh anticompetitive consequences, the potentially 
anticompetitive agreement will not be condemned, unless the opposite party argues that a less 
restrictive alternative is available.25 Rule of reason analysis imposes particular obligations on 
the parties to the antitrust proceedings to provide courts with economic and substantive 
analyses that allow judges to make a reasonable determination of the considered practices’ 
scope.26 
 
                                                 
20
 D. Bailey, ‘Presumptions in EU competition law’, ECLR 31 (2010), 364. 
21
 P. Nealis, ‘Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication under the Rule of Reason’, Ohio State 
Law Journal 61 (2000), 347 – 398. 
22
 U.S. Supreme Court, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States (1958), 78 S. Ct. 518. 
23
 According to Justice Brandeis famous exposition of rule of reason, the true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as 
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint is 
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained are all 
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the 
reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences. U.S. 
Supreme Court, Chicago Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States (1914), 34 S. Ct. 244. 
24
 Engineers, note 18 above, 1365. 
25
 H. Hovenkamp, note 19 above, 260; G. Feldman, ‘The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in 
Rule of Reason Analysis’, American University Law Review 58 (2009), 561 – 630. 
26
 S. Adkins, supra note 19 above, 24-25. 
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‘The courts have always realized that the line between the per se rule and the rule of reason is 
not as hard or as easy to locate as we might wish’.27 In a specific number of cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court allowed a superficial analysis of seemingly anticompetitive agreements 
through the application of a ‘quick look’ or truncated rule of reason test.28 ‘Quick look’ 
presents an analytical compromise between the per se and rule of reason approaches and 
allows for an efficient method of managing antitrust litigation that can otherwise become 
overly complex.29 In cases where the anticompetitive effects on consumers and markets can 
be determined by someone with a basic knowledge of economics, competitive harm is 
presumed.30 The defendant will have to prove that procompetitive justifications nevertheless 
exist in such a case.31 Whereas a quick look does not amount to a non-rebuttable per se 
prohibition or exemption, the factual rule of reason analysis remains rather limited. The 
courts basically apply a rule of reason analysis, but truncate its scope because of particular 
properties inherent in anticompetitive behaviour.32 The extent of truncated or quick look rule 
of reason nevertheless remains open and contested.33 
 
2.2.From rule of reason intra-enterprise conspiracy to per se single entity. 
 
Single entity claims have thus been considered in light of the abovementioned per se/rule of 
reason/quick look trichotomy. Early Sherman Act case law did not address the problem of 
single entity. The existence of multiple conspiring entities was often taken for granted or at 
least not questioned.34 Only in a 1947 case, U.S. v. Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court was 
directly confronted with what would later be termed a single entity claim. In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that ‘corporate interrelationships of conspirators are not determinative of 
the applicability of the Sherman Act’.35 According to the Court, a section 1 restraint ‘may 
                                                 
27
 H. Hovenkamp, note 19 above, 265. 
28
 See blown rule of reason inquiry. See U.S. Supreme Court, National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla.(1984), 104 S.Ct. 2948, stating that the Rule of Reason can sometimes be applied in the 
twinkling of an eye; U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists (1986), 
106 S. Ct. 2018. 
29
 E. Grush and C. Korenblit, ‘American Needle and a “positive” quick look approach in challenges to joint 
ventures’, Antitrust 25 (2011), 55. 
30
 S. Adkins, note 19 above, 25. 
31
 U.S. Supreme Court, California Dental Association v. FTC (1999), 119 S. Ct. 1618. The Court refers to ‘an 
intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect’. 
32
 H. Hovenkamp, note 19 above, 265. 
33
 As apparent from E. Grush and C. Korenblit, note 29 above, 57. 
34
 Sagers claims that early case law considered §1 and §2 to be interchangeable. See C. Sagers, ‘Why 
Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury, and the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the 
Firm’, forthcoming 17 Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law Journal 2011, electronic copy available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767339, at p. 6. 
35
 U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Yellow Cab Co.(1947), 67 S. Ct. 1565. 
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result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under 
common ownership as from a conspiracy of those who are otherwise independent’.36 The 
Supreme Court established its intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, holding that a single 
economic entity could not prima facie escape the antitrust provisions. 
 
As a result of Yellow Cab, intra-enterprise agreements were to be assessed following a rule of 
reason analysis, balancing their competitive effects. In so doing, particular categories of intra-
enterprise or intra-entity agreements were held to escape antitrust scrutiny because of pro-
competitive advantages. Agreements between employers and employees and between non-
incorporated branches or divisions of a corporation were held not to be covered by antitrust 
prohibitions.37 The Supreme Court formally extended that exemption in its 1962 Sunkist 
opinion, arguing that some organizational distinctions between different undertakings only 
bear limited meaning and effects relevant for antitrust law analysis.38 
 
A balanced and reasonable analysis of intra-enterprise agreements nevertheless continued to 
dominate judicial discourse. Renowned antitrust scholars severely criticized the rule of reason 
approach in Yellow Cab as a waste of time and means devoted to issues that raised no antitrust 
concerns. According to Philip Areeda, ‘[m]aking liability depend on separate incorporation of 
units within a corporate family would introduce an altogether fortuitous element into antitrust 
law. The conventional reasons for separate incorporation bear little relation to a corporate 
family’s ability or willingness to behave anticompetitively’.39 From that perspective, the mere 
dilution of entrepreneurial functions into different corporate entities should not trigger the 
application of antitrust law provisions to intra-enterprise conduct not normally subject to 
antitrust scrutiny. 
 
                                                 
36
 U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Yellow Cab Co. (1947),67 S. Ct. 1565. For similar arguments, see 
among others U.S. Supreme Court, Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States (1948), 68 S. Ct. 947; U.S. 
Supreme Court, United States v. Griffith (1948), 68, S. Ct. 941; U.S. Supreme Court, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. (1951), 71 S. Ct. 259-261; U.S. Supreme Court, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. 
United States (1951), 71 S. Ct. 971; U.S. Supreme Court, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp. 
(1968), 88 S. Ct. 1981. 
37
 The U.S. Supreme Court did not directly confirm this stance, but refused to hear appellate court cases that 
established these claims. For an overview, we refer to the Court’s own citations in Copperweld, note 13 above, 
2741. 
38
 U.S. Supreme Court, Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co.(1962), 82 S. Ct. 1136; 
U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1971), 95 S.Ct. 2099. 
39
 P. Areeda, ‘Intraenterprise conspiracy in decline’, Harvard Law Review 97 (1981), 453. 
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The 1984 Copperweld opinion sided with the Yellow Cab critics. Copperweld directly 
concerned the question whether a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally 
capable of conspiring with each other under section 1 of the Sherman Act.40 A corporation, 
Copperweld, and its wholly owned subsidiary Regal Tube Co. had purportedly agreed on 
limiting market access for Independence Tube Co., a potential competitor.41 In light of the 
Yellow Cab case law, the intra-enterprise agreement between Copperweld and Regal had to be 
assessed under a rule of reason framework. In its majority opinion42, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless claimed that in previous cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had acquiesced in the 
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine without exploring or analyzing in detail the justifications 
for such a rule.43 According to the Court, ‘nothing in the literal meaning of those terms 
excludes coordinated conduct among officers or employees of the same company. But it is 
perfectly plain that an internal agreement to implement a single, unitary firm’s policies does 
not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police. The officers of a single firm are 
not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests […]. Coordination in a 
firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition’.44 
By analogy, coordination among a corporation and its unincorporated divisions also must be 
judged as the conduct of a single actor.45 The Supreme Court reasoned that ‘[f]or similar 
reasons, the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed 
as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act’.46 A parent and its 
wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest, having common objectives and 
one corporate consciousness. They are ‘not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle 
under the control of a single driver’.47 As a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have 
a unity of purpose or a common design, the very notion of agreement in Sherman Act terms 
lacks meaning in this context48: ‘The parent may assert full control at any moment if the 
subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best interests’.49 The Court subsequently addressed the 
argument that this interpretation might highlight so-called gaps in the application of 
                                                 
40
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2734. 
41
 For a more detailed summary, see J. Stone and J. Wright, ‘Antitrust Formalism is Dead! Long Live Antitrust 
Formalism! Some implications of American Needle v. NFL’, Cato Supreme Court Review (2010), 374. 
42
 Six justices joined Chief Justice Burger in his opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 
43
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2739. 
44
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2740. 
45
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2741. 
46
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2741. 
47
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2741-2742. 
48
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2742. 
49
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2742. 
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competition law provisions. ‘Because the Sherman Act does not prohibit unreasonable 
restraints of trade as such […], it leaves untouched a single firm’s anticompetitive conduct 
(short of threatened monopolization) that may be indistinguishable in economic effect from 
the conduct of two firms subject to § 1 liability.[…] Congress made a purposeful choice to 
accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct. Had congress intended to 
outlaw unreasonable restraints as such, § 1’s requirement of a contract, combination or 
conspiracy would be superfluous, as would the entirety of § 2’.50 The Supreme Court could 
therefore only conclude that the coordinated behaviour of a parent and its wholly owned 
subsidiary falls outside the reach of section 1.51 
 
2.3.American Needle and the retreat from per se single entity 
 
2.3.1. Copperweld’s per se puzzle 
 
The Copperweld opinion vindicated an immediate antitrust exemption in any instance of 
coordination between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary. As such, Copperweld has 
been comprehended to have introduced a conclusively presumed per se exemption from 
antitrust scrutiny: agreements between parents and wholly owned subsidiaries. The scope of 
this per se exemption nevertheless remains puzzling as two alternative Copperweld readings 
could be presented. 
 
One -extensive- way is to read in Copperweld a per se exemption from antitrust law 
application for all kinds of hybrid corporate affiliation situations. The Copperweld per se 
exclusion would thus capture alternative affiliations among corporate entities. But how far 
would this per se exemption go? The Supreme Court specifically did not ‘consider under what 
circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it 
does not completely own’.52 That language did however leave open a potential extension of 
per se non-applicability to precisely these situations. To what extent could the Copperweld 
principle of per se intra-enterprise immunity be extended to situations in which a subsidiary 
was only partially owned by another business? How about franchising agreements, 
distribution agreements between producer and distributors,…? The scope of Copperweld is 
                                                 
50
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2743-2744. 
51
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2744. 
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potentially limitless and analytical boundaries are difficult to draw. In the words of appellate 
judge and former Antitrust Division official Michael Boudin, ‘once one goes beyond the 
classical single enterprise, including Copperweld situations, it is difficult to find an easy 
stopping point or even decide on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases’.53 
 
An alternative narrow reading of Copperweld has also remained in swung. That reading aligns 
with the dissenting opinion voiced by Justice Stevens, but is also reflected throughout the 
majority opinion in Copperweld. Stevens proposed to analyze all single entity claims 
exclusively within a rule of reason framework. The parent – wholly owned subsidiary 
relationship would equally be covered by rule of reason scrutiny. According to Stevens, 
wholly owned subsidiaries and their parents do not eliminate competition that would 
otherwise exist; they rather enhance their own ability to compete.54 The original purpose of 
the Sherman Act was to address the use of corporate subsidiaries as devices to eliminate 
competition.55 Establishing a per se rule against intra-enterprise conspiracy leaves ‘a 
significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is 
entirely unrelated to efficiencies associated with integration’.56 Moreover, mere functional 
integration of subsidiary and parent ‘has never been sufficient to establish the existence of an 
unreasonable restraint of trade’.57 Actions of affiliated corporations can nevertheless be 
unrelated to the aim of functional integration and could thus impose restraints on third parties 
of sufficient magnitude to restrain market-wide competition.58 If that were the case, it is 
appropriate to characterize conduct as a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.59 
Only a full-fledged rule of reason analysis would be able to assess the scope of behaviour of 
affiliated corporations or businesses.  
 
Based on Justice Stevens’ dissent, the narrow approach proposes a rule of reason analysis, 
except in the specific situation of a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary. In the latter 
instance, a per se non-application of antitrust law would remain in place. Agreements between 
otherwise affiliated corporations would be subjected to rule of reason analysis. A footnote in 
the Copperweld majority opinion seems to confirm that approach. The Court there claimed 
                                                 
53
 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Iain Fraser et al. v. Major League Soccer L.L.C. et al. (2002), 284 
F.3d 59. 
54
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2745. 
55
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2750. 
56
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2751. 
57
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2752-2753. 
58
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2753. 
59
 Copperweld, note 13 above, 2753. 
 13
that a single entity tests sets forth various criteria for evaluating whether a given parent and 
subsidiary are capable of conspiring with each other. Those criteria measure the 
“separateness” of the subsidiary, rather than to proclaim its unity. They include separate 
control of day-to-day operations, separate officers, separate headquarters etc. In case of 
wholly owned subsidiaries however, these separateness criteria do not serve to evaluate the 
scope of economic unity that is inherent to wholly owned subsidiary constellations.60 
 
The narrow reading also invited judges and scholars to devise more nuanced legal tests to 
assess the scope of single entity claims. Williamson asked whether, on the basis of 
Copperweld, one could ‘identify other objective criteria for identifying other structures to 
which the law might yet extend relief’61. He proposed a nuanced rule of reason framework 
based on affiliates’ control and conduct extracted from the ‘common control’ and ‘unity of 
interests’ requirements voiced in Copperweld. First, courts should determine whether or not 
the corporations or businesses involved present an economic unity. Economic unity cannot 
however be limited to a unity of interests, because, even in a fully integrated corporation, 
conflicting interests continue to engage corporate decision making.62 Unity of interests has 
often been translated into claims of control rights and control mechanisms related to but also 
potentially different from corporate ownership.63 Williamson therefore proposed or at least 
imagined ownership rights to constitute indications of corporate control.64 To the extent that 
no ownership-based control could be inferred, courts would be invited to assess whether or 
not the corporations involved constitute actual or potential competitors in the market related 
to the scrutinized activity. Only in cases where actual or potential competition threats are 
absent should the courts approve single entity claims.65 
 
2.3.2. Reintroducing rule of reason in American Needle. 
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Both readings remained in swung after Copperweld. A number of federal courts seemed to 
prefer the narrow reading of Copperweld and applied a rule of reason framework to analyze 
single entity claims that did not fall within the wholly owned subsidiary situation covered by 
the Copperweld opinion.66 Other courts notably extended Copperweld’s per se principle to 
other hybrid forms of affiliation.67 The 2010 American Needle case finally established the 
scope and existence of per se single entity non-application. 
 
American Needle questioned whether and how antitrust law should regulate ‘the peculiar, 
perhaps incomparable, business entity known as a professional sports league’.68 In particular, 
the Supreme Court was invited to assess whether or not the US National Football League 
(NFL) constituted a single entity the operations of which could escape antitrust scrutiny.69 To 
the extent that the NFL presented a single entity, decisions taken among its members would 
not comprise a contract, combination or conspiracy in violation of Section 1. 
 
‘The NFL is an unincorporated association that now includes 32 separately owned 
professional football teams. Each team has its own name, colors, and logo, and owns related 
intellectual property’.70 In 1963, the different teams decided to form a joint National Football 
League Properties (NFLP) organization to develop license and market their intellectual 
property and to allow for a redistribution of profits through a NFLP Trust.71 NFLP granted 
nonexclusive licenses to different manufacturers to provide and sell apparel bearing NFL 
teams’ insignias. In 2000 however, the NFL team members allowed NFLP to grant exclusive 
licenses. NFLP granted an exclusive license to Reebok International Ltd to sell NFL teams’ 
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logoed headwear. As a consequence, it did not renew the nonexclusive license of American 
Needle, another company engaged in the headwear business.72 
 
American Needle responded to its termination of license by filing a claim alleging that the 
agreements between the NFL, its teams, NFLP and Reebok violated section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.73 The NFL and its constituent teams claimed that they were unable to conspire, because 
they comprise a single economic enterprise for the purposes of their licensing business. Both 
the federal District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the NFL’s 
single entity claim.74 With regard to the licensing of intellectual property rights, the NFL 
teams can function only as one source of economic power when collectively producing NFL 
football.75 More specifically, the Seventh Circuit argued that ‘in some contexts, a league 
seems more aptly described as a single entity immune from antitrust scrutiny, while in others 
a league appears to be a joint venture between independently owned teams that is subject to 
review under § 1’.76 The context of this dispute warranted recognition of the NFL’s single 
entity status. 
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In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stevens – the dissenting Justice in Copperweld – , 
the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Circuit and at the very least confirmed a 
preference for a narrow reading of Copperweld.77 
 
Justice Stevens held that ‘we have eschewed […] formalistic distinctions in favor of a 
functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct 
actually operate’.78 A functional approach inquires whether the alleged contract is actually 
concerted action, i.e. whether or not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic 
interests have been involved.79 That is only the case to the extent that the agreement deprives 
the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking, of a diversity of entrepreneurial 
interests and of actual or potential competition.80 A functional approach has allowed the 
Supreme Court to find section 1 violations in cases where a legally single entity was actually 
controlled by a group of competitors, serving as a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.81 It 
has equally provided multiple corporate legal entities with assertions that they have a 
complete ‘unity of interests’, and therefore act as one economic single unity.82 An entity can 
thus comprise different entities for the purposes of incorporation or formal title, even though 
it reflects a single center of decision-making and controls a single aggregation of economic 
power.83 
 
In the particular context of American Needle, the NFL teams do not appear to act as one 
single entity. ‘Each of the teams is a substantial, independently owned, and independently 
managed business. Their general corporate actions are guided or determined by separate 
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corporate consciousnesses and their objectives are not common’.84 The teams are constantly 
competing, ‘not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts 
with managerial and playing personnel’ and in the market for intellectual property.85 
‘Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned trademarks collectively and to 
only one vendor are decisions that deprive the marketplace of independent centres of 
decision-making’.86 
 
The teams argued that the creation of a single legal person, NFLP, justified its single entity 
defense. That argument reflects the intuitively appealing claim that ‘a defining characteristic 
of a single entity is that control is concentrated in the hands of a single party’.87 NFLP, 
according to the defendants in American Needle, presented single party control and should 
therefore be granted per se relief from antitrust scrutiny. The Supreme Court replied that 
giving an ongoing Section 1 violation a new name or label does not evade antitrust scrutiny.88 
Moreover, even though the Court generally treats ‘agreements within a single firm as 
independent action on the presumption that the components of the firm will act to maximize 
the firm’s profits’, the presumption does not hold in rare cases ‘when the parties to the 
agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself and the intra-firm agreements 
may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action’.89 The collective licensing of 
intellectual property through NFLP could potentially represent such a rare case. To discover 
those cases, a rule of reason analysis is preferable over an extension of per se rules.90  
 
The Supreme Court thus held that sports leagues’ conduct related to intellectual property 
licensing is not categorically (or per se) beyond section 1’s coverage.91 American Needle’s 
single entity claim therefore needed to be reassessed under a rule of reason analysis.92 The 
Court nevertheless remains cryptic, adding that depending upon the activity in question, the 
rule of reason can at times be applied in its quick look fashion, without specifically 
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explaining when and how.93 The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court 
for further proceedings.94 
 
2.4.Single entity test after American Needle 
 
American Needle clearly restructures and clarifies the single entity defense into a broader rule 
of reason framework.95 The confines of the rule of reason single entity test nevertheless 
remain unclear and it will be in the hands of lower courts to reinterpret the status of single 
entity defenses as a matter of U.S. antitrust law. In this section, we briefly extract the 
conditions that have guided the Supreme Court in framing its American Needle single entity 
defense. These conditions constitute the basis for a full-fledged U.S. antitrust law single entity 
test, focusing on the absence of independent centers of decisionmaking, the absence of 
concurring entrepreneurial interests and the lack of actual or potential competition among 
constituent entities.96 
 
American Needle did not explicitly overrule Copperweld, but re-interpreted its meaning to 
propose a rule of reason test rather than a per se approach to affiliated corporations. In the 
words of one group of commentators, ‘before American Needle, lower courts agreed that 
complete common ownership was a sufficient condition for single-entity status but not, 
perhaps a necessary one. Following American Needle, complete common ownership now 
appears to be a necessary condition for single-entity status, but not a sufficient one’.97 Even 
though the underlying rationale of that claim is correct, we read American Needle’s single 
entity test in a more nuanced way. Copperweld’s per se approach does no longer present the 
dominant analytical framework to address any single entity defense in U.S. antitrust law. 
American Needle seemingly presents an open-ended rule of reason framework, allowing 
wholly owned subsidiaries to be excluded from section 1 scrutiny under a (quick look) rule of 
reason analysis.98 At the same time, the opinion does not require common ownership to be 
necessary to establish single entity status. It rather allows a more nuanced single entity test to 
be developed, capturing both wholly owned subsidiaries and hybrid affiliations among 
corporate entities. 
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The American Needle opinion does not explicitly proclaim a single ‘single entity’ testing 
framework. The opinion rather presents the conditions for a judicially refined single entity 
analysis framework.99 American Needle distinguishes three conditions: control (absence of 
independent decisionmaking centers), interests (absence of concurring entrepreneurial 
interests) and ‘competitive links’ (lack of actual or potential competition).100 The interactions 
among these three conditions can be captured by the establishment of presumptions and rule 
of reason shortcuts101 that can be extracted from earlier case law, American Needle and 
scholarly proposals. That would lead to the following three step single entity test, combining 
Williamson’s two-step test and American Needle analysis. 
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First, considerations of control implicitly dominate current scholarly and judicial 
argumentation.102 The concept of control is elusive. It should be understood as legal regimes 
allowing particular corporate entities or individuals to influence decision making processes in 
other corporate entities.103 Control thus operationalizes part of the unity of interests claims 
developed in Copperweld. The presence of control rights themselves allows courts to evaluate 
the extent of separateness among affiliated or non-affiliated actors. Control embraces a variety 
of legal regimes of affirmative or negative rights enabling cooperative or hierarchical 
relationships among different corporate entities to be structured and maintained.104 
Affirmative rights establish rights to redeploy assets or impose initiatives, including the right 
to delegate functions or to exit a governance structure without obtaining approval. These 
rights are often – but do not have to be – connected to company ownership.105 Negative 
control rights on the other hand are rights to block other parties initiatives, through approval 
or veto procedures. Again, these rights could be related to ownership, and often are, but do 
not necessarily have to be held solely by a majority shareholder.106 The presence of strong 
affirmative and negative control rights could reflect a prima facie unity of purpose or 
interests.  
 
The extent to which control rights establish presumptions of single entity is unclear at best. 
The types or kinds of affirmative or negative rights that are determinate in establishing single 
entity status are difficult to detect in the abstract and without full-fledged rule of reason 
analysis. It therefore remains to be seen how much weight will be attached to particular 
control rights. 
 
Control rights could – but should not – be related to ownership rights. A first step in analyzing 
control could thus be the reflection of ownership structures. In a Copperweld situation 
(wholly owned subsidiary, or unincorporated divisions or entity-employee relationships), 
ownership structures typically include both affirmative and negative control rights. It could 
therefore be assumed that full ownership implies control and that control allow for attribution 
                                                 
102
 Even though J. Stone and J. Wright, note 41 above, 379, argue that interests outweigh control in single entity 
analysis, their focus on Copperweld presumes elements of control to be present in the background; D. 
Williamson, note 7 above,734. Control aspects did determine Copperweld’s outcome and appeared in the 
language of ‘separate decisionmaking centers’ in American Needle. 
103
 Control is often associated with the theory of the firm in economics. For more references in that regard, see 
W. Wils, note 1 above, 102-104; J. Stone and J. Wright, note 41 above, 379-381. 
104
 D. Williamson, note 7 above, 738-739. 
105
 D. Williamson, note 7 above, 736. 
106
 D. Williamson, note 7 above, 738. 
 21
of single entity status in those instances. Whereas Copperweld seemed to establish a 
conclusive, non-rebuttable per se presumption, American Needle turned this presumption 
semi-conclusive.107 Copperweld situations still present a strong case against antitrust scrutiny, 
but it would not seem improbable that in particular cases, evidence to the contrary could be 
adduced in a rule of reason framework.108 Because of the overwhelming presumption of 
control in Copperweld situations, a quick look or truncated rule of reason analysis would 
seem most appropriate in this stage of the single entity test.109 
 
Ownership and control are not always inherently related.110 Ownership merely constitutes a 
proxy in a control rights analysis. Applying a truncated rule of reason analysis, courts could 
also establish the extent of control rights in non-Copperweld situations. These situations 
include all sorts of hybrid affiliations such as particular joint ventures in sports leagues. In 
those situations, the courts would have to look for alternative affirmative or negative control 
rights to establish single entity status. As such, the Supreme Court (and lower courts) would 
be invited to establish scenarios in which particular affirmative or negative rights are more apt 
to presume control. According to some courts and scholars, affirmative approval rights and 
are good proxies of control, presenting sufficient evidence to establish the absence of separate 
decisionmaking centers.111 A quick look investigation into these rights serves as an analytical 
barrier for a more full-fledged rule of reason analysis. To the extent that no significant 
elements of affirmative or negative control can be detected, the courts should proceed with a 
more careful rule of reason analysis to establish control. In the event of insignificant or 
limited control rights, the single entity plea should immediately be rejected. 
 
Second, requirements of diversity of entrepreneurial interests imposes additional elements to 
the rule of reason analysis American Needle promotes. Once a sufficient or significant – 
depending on the Supreme Court’s further elaborations on this matter - standard of control has 
been established, most cases do not allow for the determination of single entity status in and 
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of itself. The notion of ‘entrepreneurial interests’ requires courts to analyze present control 
rights within a broader corporate operational framework.112 The entrepreneurial interest 
analysis does not specifically consider competitive interests or the situation in which both 
entities actually constitute competitors in a particular market. Rather, entrepreneurial interests 
aim to define whether and to what extent the reasons for different entities establishing and 
accepting control rights concur or differ. Are these control rights mutual or do they represent 
a subordination of one entity to another? In the former case, the interests of both entities to 
establish control rights could be related to diverse entrepreneurs aiming to collaborate despite 
divergences in entrepreneurial interests. In the latter, control rights would seem to imply the 
creation of a subordinated entity to facilitate realization of concurring interests. Even in that 
case however, the inquiry should focus on what entities hold control rights. To the extent that 
two different entities entertain similar control rights, a presumption of concurring 
entrepreneurial interests might not hold as both entities might actually engage in illicit 
cartelizing behaviour. From that perspective, the creation of joint ventures might pose 
particular problems from a single entity vantage point.113 
 
The diversity of entrepreneurial interests stage thus bridges control rights and conduct 
investigations and allows for another truncated analysis of what would otherwise imply a full-
fledged rule of reason analysis. Whereas Copperweld situations again establish a rebuttable 
presumption of concurring entrepreneurial interests, other situations could equally be captured 
by a similar presumption. The unilateral establishment of a particular balanced combination of 
affirmative and negative control rights could also presume a concurrence of entrepreneurial 
interests. The courts will nevertheless have to strike that balance more clearly. In that respect, 
the nature and establishment conditions of control rights present a second truncated or quick 
look phase towards single entity claims. To the extent that a presumption of concurring 
entrepreneurial interests can be established through a quick look analysis, a presumption of 
single entity would seem to apply. 
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A third condition can be related to the absence of actual or potential competition or 
‘complementarity’114 among parts of a presumed single entity. Absence of actual or potential 
competition functions as an additional condition, allowing even fully controlled and 
incentivised businesses to be considered more than just single entities in cases of particular 
market conduct. It assesses whether or not the entities present themselves as actual or 
potential competitors in the market. Questions remain whether or not actual or potential 
competitors should be considered in light of a metaphysical market or in light of the market to 
which antitrust infringements could be related. In the former case, controlling rights and 
interests could more easily support the conclusion that entities are competitors in “the” 
market. In the latter case, which is the preferable choice, a full rule of reason analysis, 
including determining the relevant market and market shares of entities would be required to 
determine the activities of controlling (and controlled) entities in a particular market segment, 
at least to the extent that they constitute actual competitors.115 If no actual competition seems 
present, the potentiality of these entities competing in a particular market segment should be 
predicted. American Needle seems to rely on that approach, assessing the potential 
competitive relationships among NFL teams in the intellectual property markets.116 The 
potential competition test assesses whether or not potential single entity parties provide 
complementary inputs in the productive process or whether they basically foreclose new 
market developments.117 In Copperweld situations, the overwhelming controlling relationship 
would seem to make potential competition among parent and subsidiary illusory, even if both 
engage in different market activities. To that extent, significant market evidence would have 
to be adduced to condemn the Copperweld relationship as a cartel. Based on the Supreme 
Court’s reading, that situation is not likely to occur, but at the very least remains a theoretical 
possibility. The abovementioned hypothetical situation of presumed diverse entrepreneurial 
interests would equally establish a presumption of potential competition in the relevant 
market, thus allowing a quick look analysis to market structure in order to defeat a single 
entity claim. In both instances, it is clear that this third stage mainly serves as an additional 
phase in which to rebut or confirm presumptions related to earlier stages. In cases where a 
reasonable element of control and concurring entrepreneurial interest appears, this phase’s 
                                                 
114
 D. Williamson, note 7 above, 742 refers to the notion of complementarity. We prefer to use the broader and 
more familiar notion of ‘absence of actual or potential competition’. 
115
 American Needle, note 14 above, combined reading of 2213 and 2216. D. Williamson, note 7 above, 742. 
116
 Even though these competitive relationships in the market not always clear, specifically in relation to labor 
regulations, N. Grow, note 74 above, 287-288. 
117
 D. Williamson, note 7 above, 742. 
 24
full-fledged rule of reason could provide more analytical certainty about a single entity’s 
(non-)existence. 
 
Table 1 distinguishes four categories of affiliation through which the rule of reason analysis 
could operate differently: 
 
Table 1: U.S. Single Entity testing framework 
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Included in full 
rule of reason 
analysis 
Included in full 
rule of reason 
analysis 
 
The operational conditions thus initially present themselves as cumulative conditions, each of 
them in itself insufficient to establish single entity status. Only to the extent that the 
Copperweld rationale applies, a now rebuttable presumption of single entity can be 
 25
maintained throughout. Intra-corporation agreements between unincorporated divisions, 
between employees and between wholly-owned subsidiaries, or the latter and parents could 
indeed gain single entity status with the twinkling of an eye.118 In other instances, courts will 
have to carve out whether and to what extent presumptions of control, incentives or 
competitive links merit truncated or full-fledged rule of reason to either rebut or confirm what 
has been presumed, as exemplified in the abovementioned algorithm. Rather than settling 
debates on single entity, American Needle invigorated a new era of more intense judicial 
operationalization of a rule of reason single entity test. 
 
3. Single entity claims in EU competition law 
 
This part discusses single entity claims in EU competition law. The concept of single entity is 
structured within the undertaking concept in EU law (section 1). The notion of undertaking 
has been applied to limit the scope of competition law enforcement (section 2), but more 
recently, focus has shifted towards extending the scope of imputation of fines (section 3). 
Both approaches rely on similar concepts and reflect a the nascence of an EU single entity test 
based on control and conduct conceptions similar to those in U.S. antitrust law (section 4). 
 
3.1.The entity component of undertakings and the application and enforcement of EU 
competition law 
Single entity analysis in EU law is enshrined a broader ‘undertaking’ concept.119 The notion 
of undertaking is pivotal for the scope of application of EU competition law. As is well-
known, Article 101 TFEU prohibits restrictive agreements between undertakings, whereas 
Article 102 prohibits undertakings to abuse a dominant market position. Agreements or 
coordinated action among components of a single undertaking fall outside the scope of the 
Article 101 prohibition.120 They can only be captured by the Article 102 prohibition if these 
single undertaking components engage in abusive market behaviour.121 
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The presence and scope of an undertaking depends on judicially established conditions and 
limits. From the 1991 Höfner judgment onwards122, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
consistently set forth a single definition of undertaking: ‘the concept of an undertaking 
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the 
entity and the way in which it is financed’.123 This definition comprises two components: 
entity and economic activity.124 The second component mainly determines the extent to which 
particular activities can be considered ‘economic’. The case law on this component assesses 
whether social security providers or public enterprises engage in economic activities.125 That 
question is not directly relevant for our analysis of the entity component and will not be 
discussed here. 
 
The basic elements of the (single) entity component have been interpreted quite consistently 
over time.126 In the Shell-case127 the General Court stated that a single entity is an ‘economic 
unit which consist of an unitary organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements 
which pursues a specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the 
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commission of an infringement of the kind referred to in that provision’.128 Earlier ECJ case 
law stated that an entity could consist of ‘several persons, natural or legal’.129 In particular, 
multiple legal persons could be considered a single entity if business or personal links exist 
between those legal persons. The notion of business links refers to a parent company 
effectively influencing commercial policy, personal links relate to the sharing of directors or 
executives among different legal persons.130 Not unlike U.S. antitrust law, the single entity 
concept is thus approached from a functional perspective. Legal personhood does not play a 
determining role in establishing the limits of the undertaking concept. 
 
The entity concept thus determines the scope of application of EU competition law. To the 
extent that a particular business structure does not fit the entity definition, EU competition 
prohibitions will not apply to that structure’s behaviour. Simultaneously, the single entity 
notion also determines the scope of the structure ‘to which a certain behaviour is 
attributable’.131 The latter function allows competition authorities to develop single entity 
claims in order to impose fines on groups of corporate entities. Single entity claims in that 
respect enhance competition law prosecution. According to Regulation 1/2003, the fines 
imposed on undertakings or associations of undertakings when infringements of the articles 
101 and 102 of the Treaty are committed intentionally or negligently, shall not exceed 10% of 
the total turnover in the preceding business year of each undertaking and association of 
undertakings participating in the infringement.132 Group members can thus be held jointly and 
severally liable for competition law infringements.133 A more extensive entity conception that 
integrates different legal entities into a single economic entity allows for higher fines to be 
calculated on the turnover of every component of that single entity. 
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3.2.Single entity defenses in EU competition law 
 
The single entity concept has long provided groups of corporate legal persons with an escape 
from EU competition law. In 1971, the ECJ held that one undertaking could comprise several 
corporations which can be organized in a simple parent company and subsidiary scheme or in 
even more complex schemes with several levels of subsidiaries.134 When dealing with a group 
of undertakings, the constituent factor one should bear in mind is not whether those 
undertakings have a separate legal personality, but whether or not they act together on the 
market as a single unit.135 Single unit market conduct implies that a subsidiary or affiliate has 
no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market.136 The assessment of single 
economic unit status crucially depends on control and conduct factors, including among 
others parental control over the board of directors, instructions imposed on the subsidiary to 
be carried out, the amount of profit taken by the parent and other elements referring to real 
decisive influence by a parent over its subsidiary.137 The exact weight attributed to either 
ownership, non-ownership control or additional conduct factors has been the subject of 
intense discussions and divergent interpretations. 
 
The interrelations between control and conduct are most apparent in the case law on the single 
entity status of hybrid affiliations involved in distribution, commercial agency and other 
intermediary agreements.138 Commercial agency agreements potentially benefit from single 
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entity immunity, as the conduct of ‘independent’ commercial agents139 is often quite 
dependent on instructions received from a principal.140 In the pilot case of Suiker-Unie141, the 
ECJ affirmed what already had been established in earlier decisions of the European 
Commission.142 It stated that ‘if an agent works for the benefit of his principal he may in 
principle be treated as an auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the latter’s undertaking, 
who must carry out his principal’s instructions and thus, like a commercial employee, forms 
an economic unit with this undertaking’.143 The Court of Justice presented a two-step test 
relying on market conduct in order to verify the degree of autonomy of the agent. First the 
agent may not bear any financial risk. Second, the agent may not engage in activities of both 
agent and independent trader in respect of the same market.144 In the Suiker-Unie case the 
ECJ decided that article 101 TFEU was applicable since ‘(…) it is not disputed that the agents 
in question are large business houses, which at the same time as they distribute sugar for the 
account of the applicant, (…) undertake a very considerable amount of business for their own 
on the sugar mark145 (…) Thus these representatives are authorized to act as independent 
dealer146 (…)The integration of representatives in its sales organization ‘did not rule out the 
possibility that agents may also compete with independent dealers, in particular when they 
sell for their own account (…)’.147 
 
The Court subsequently extended this reasoning to wholly owned subsidiaries. In the 
important Viho case148, Parker Pen Ltd. sold its products through wholly owned subsidiaries 
                                                 
139
 The definition of commercial agency agreements: « they cover the situation in which a legal or physical 
person (the agent) is vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts on behalf of another person 
(the principal), either in the agent's own name, or in the name of the principal for the purchase of goods or 
services by the principal or the sale of goods or services supplied by the principal» (see Commission Notice on 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 230/1, 19 May 2010, para. 12) 
140
 Case 311/85, ASBL Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisbureaus v ASBL Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en 
Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] ECR 3801, para. 20; Case C-266/93 Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen AG 
and VAG Leasing GmbH. [1995] ECR I-3477, para. 19; Case T-66/99 Minoan Lines SA v Commission of the 
European Communities [2003] ECR II- 5515, para. 125; Case T-325/01 Daimler Chrysler AG v Commission of 
the European Communities [2005] ECR, II- 3319, para. 86; Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de 
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía Española de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-11987, para. 42; I. 
Lianos, ‘Commercial agency agreements, vertical restraints, and the limits of Article 81(1) EC: between 
hierarchies and networks’, J.C.L. & E.2007, 3 (4), (625) 628; A. Jones and B. Sufrin, note 121 above, 2011, 135. 
141
 Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114/73, Coöperatieve Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA and 
others v Commission of the European Communities [1975] ECR 1663 (hereafter referred to as Suiker Unie). 
142
 Commission, Pittsburgh Corning Europe O.J. 1972 L 272/35; I. Lianos, note 140 above, 632. 
143
 Suiker Unie,  note 141 above, para. 480. 
144
 I. Lianos, note 140 above, 633. 
145
 Suiker Unie, note 141 above, para. 544. 
146
 Suiker Unie, note 141 above, para. 546. 
147
 Suiker Unie note 141above, para. 547. 
148
 Case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe BV v Commission of the European Communities [1996] ECR I-5457 (hereafter 
referred to as Viho). 
 30
in various member states. In so doing, the parent company divided the common market into 
national markets between its subsidiaries. The ECJ, following the General Court’s approach, 
did not consider Article 101 applicable in this context. According to the court, ‘where, as in 
this case, the subsidiary, although having a separate legal personality, does not freely 
determine its conduct on the market but carries out the instructions given to it directly or 
indirectly by the parent company by which it is wholly controlled, Article [101] does not 
apply to the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent company with which it forms 
an economic unit’.149 The distribution subsidiaries did not enjoy real autonomy in determining 
their course of action in the market, as they merely had to carry out the instructions of the 
controlling parent company.150 
 
Suiker Unie and Viho present an EU single entity test relying on control and conduct. 
Whereas Suiker Unie presumes non-ownership based control, Viho distinguishes elements of 
ownership-based control (intra-enterprise behaviour or potentially decisive influence) and 
market conduct (extra-enterprise behaviour or actual decisive influence151) as two 
fundamental variables to establish single entity claims in EU law.152 Neither Suiker Unie nor 
Viho did establish a clear hierarchy among these elements. The degree to which ownership 
based control, alternative control elements or specific market conduct determine single entity 
claims remains unclear. 
 
The ECJ also considered whether or not employee agreements could be captured by Article 
101. Again, it relied on similar elements of control and conduct to assess single entity claims. 
Competition law may apply to a natural person who constitutes an undertaking in accordance 
with article 101 TFEU when acting independently.153 However in the Albany case the 
Advocate General argued that this was not the case when an individual acts as an employee 
on the economic market. ‘First, it is difficult to see how the term ‘undertaking’ could be 
understood in the sense of ‘employee’. (…)Secondly, the functional interpretation of the term 
‘undertaking’ which the Court has adopted in its case-law leads to the same result (…) thirdly, 
the system of Community competition law is not tailored to be applicable to employees’.154 
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Since an employee cannot act independently from the undertaking, he or she is incorporated 
in the undertaking. The undertaking therefore comprises an economic unit with each 
employee.155 
 
In determining if an individual acts independently or as an employee, the ECJ again takes into 
account whether or not the individual bears the direct commercial risk of the transaction156, 
whether they are subject to orders from their employer and whether they offer services and 
goods to different clients or work for one single employer.157 The ECJ decided that custom 
agents constitute undertakings since ‘they offer, for payment services consisting in the 
carrying out of customs formalities, (…)as well as complementary services (…) Furthermore, 
they assume the financial risks involved in the exercise of that activity’.158 The Court also 
applied these constituent factors in later cases. Registered members of the Bar Association 
(self-employed lawyers) are undertakings,159 as are self-employed medical specialists.160 
Dock workers have an employment relationship with the undertakings for which they perform 
dock work as they work for and under the direction of each of those undertakings.161 
3.3.Single entity prosecution and parent company liability 
 
In addition to providing a shield against applying EU competition rules, single entity claims 
have more recently been rediscovered as swords to extend the scope of enforcement of these 
rules.162 In so doing, similar criteria also relied on to exclude single entities from the scope of 
competition law have resurfaced to ensure a more inclusive entity subject to competition law 
fines. The prosecutorial perspective provides fundamental insights into how the ECJ 
operationalizes or could further operationalize the weight attached to ownership, control and 
conduct requirements in a general EU single entity test. 
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The ECJ established that infringements committed by subsidiaries could be attributed to the 
parent company or to other “related” companies163, to the extent that the latter exercise direct 
or actual influence over the subsidiary’s decisionmaking practices.164 In those instances, an 
undertaking will often be held to have engaged in restrictive practices with another 
undertaking, represented by a subsidiary corporate entity. Parent companies can thus be held 
liable for restrictive practices engaged in by subsidiaries. 
The conditions for attributing competition law infringements to parent companies – and thus 
to establish single entity status –rely on control and market conduct variables. According to 
the ECJ, ‘the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not sufficient to exclude 
the possibility of its conduct being imputed to the parent company, especially where the 
subsidiary does not independently decide its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all 
material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company’.165 The ability to 
influence market conduct is in the first place assessed in light of present control rights, rather 
than the actual exercise of control as such.166 In that respect, particular attention is paid to ‘the 
economic, organisational and legal links between [different] legal entities’.167 The concept of 
control nevertheless presents operational difficulties in determining a correct standard to 
assess whether or not economic, legal or organizational links are sufficient. With a view to 
operationalize control, the Courts have regularly relied on ownership presumptions to 
substantiate corporate control claims. 
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In Akzo, the ECJ held that ‘in the specific case where a parent company has a 100% 
shareholding in a subsidiary which has infringed the Community competition rules, first, the 
parent company can exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of the subsidiary and, 
second, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a 
decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary’.168 Full ownership does not only 
presume corporate control, it also presumes decisive market conduct influence.169 The fact 
that other circumstances had been taken into account in earlier case law170, does not however 
make the application of the presumption ‘subject to the production of additional indicia 
relating to the actual exercise of influence by the parent company’.171 
 
Akzo is particularly controversial because the ECJ took sides in a debate that included two 
approaches to single entity prosecution.172 The first approach entailed a full blown (belts and 
braces) inquiry of single entity, requiring the European Commission to establish both control 
and conduct parameters being fulfilled in order to attribute anticompetitive conduct to a parent 
company. The second approach requires the Commission merely to establish control and 
imposes the entire burden of proof on the defendant parent company to establish its non-
single entity status. 173  It requires the parent company to establish that it did not influence the 
subsidiary’s conduct or did not fully control the subsidiary’s decision making process. 
 
The burden of proving the absence of influence on conduct or lack of control has generated 
controversy, as two readings can be adduced to rebut a presumption of single entity based on 
parenthood. According to the General Court and confirmed on appeal by the Court of Justice, 
the parent company should establish that it was not ‘able to influence pricing policy 
production and distribution activities, sales objectives, gross margins, sales costs, cash flow, 
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stocks and marketing’.174 A parent could thus rebut single entity presumptions by 
demonstrating that it did not influence the subsidiary’s market bevaviour in its specific niche 
of operations. At the same time, the ECJ in Akzo held that parent companies could also bring 
forward alternative relevant factors. These factors relate to all economic, organizational or 
legal links established between subsidiary and parent.175 Scholars have read that requirement 
to impose on parent companies the burden to establish lack of management influence on the 
conduct of the subsidiary in general and not merely on the market related to competition law 
infringements.176 More specifically, it would require a parent company to establish that it did 
not have control over the subsidiary’s operations, which would in practice be impossible to 
achieve, because a parent – subsidiary relationship precisely by nature implies some level of 
control.177 We do however read the ECJ’s ‘all elements’ requirements in a more nuanced way. 
According to that reading, the ECJ meant to hold that its presumption of single entity could be 
rebutted by both evidence related to control and to conduct. It does not however hold that 
claims solely based on either control or conduct are insufficient to rebut the Akzo 
presumption. In line with the Advocate General, ‘the decisive factor is whether the parent 
company, by reason of the intensity of its influence, can direct the conduct of its subsidiary to 
such an extent that the two must be regarded as one economic unit’.178 The ECJ merely 
provided a basis for a single entity test based on interacting control and conduct variables. To 
the extent that a presumption of control has been established, lack of influence on particular 
conduct could still remain sufficient evidence to rebut single entity claims. The extent to 
which that is the case does however remain unclear from the Court’s judgment in Akzo. 
 
3.4.The EU single entity test 
Control and conduct are crucial components of the judicially established EU single entity test, 
even though their interaction or cumulative application remains unclear in many instances.179 
Notions of (corporate) control are crucial in establishing a single entity. The ECJ clearly 
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mentions control to be an important element of single entity discourse.180 Not unlike U.S. law, 
control is operationalized through affirmative and negative control rights. Control at first sight 
firmly relates to ownership rights181, but as the Court itself makes clear in relation to 
commercial agents, control does not need to imply ownership.182 In non-ownership cases, the 
courts appear willing to draw inferences from commercial or financial risk and other factors. 
In all instances however, control rights appear sufficient to pass the first single entity hurdle. 
Control rights have to be direct: the mere presence of a single parent company of two sister 
companies cannot suffice to infer elements of control among sister companies’ interactions.183 
Direct control rights therefore often presuppose a vertical relationship, whether ownership 
based or not. 
 
In addition to control, integrated market conduct comprises a second step in establishing a 
single entity test. As mentioned above, the scope of market conduct could be assessed either 
in general or in the specific market related to the competition law infringement at stake. 
“Market conduct” assesses whether a subsidiary or controlled entity is able to determine its 
own policies and actions on the market or the actual freedom it has been granted to operate in 
a particular market segment.184 To the extent it cannot do either, the controlled entity is 
presumed to constitute a single undertaking with the controlling entity.185 From a 
                                                 
180
 One could even argue that the ECJ is more direct here than the US Supreme Court in American Needle. The 
US Supreme Court only discussed control in the margin of its independent centers of decisionmaking condition 
in American Needle. Read in conjunction with Copperweld however, one could (and in our opinion, should) 
argue that control is crucial in the U.S. single entity’s test as well. As part two highlighted, control remains the 
most fundamental proxy for assessing the independence of decisionmaking centers. 
181
 At least in cases concerning parent company liability, but see T. Feaster and P. Treacy, ‘When two into one 
will go: intra-group agreements and Article 85(1)’, E.L.Rev. 27 (1997), 576 for a perspective on ‘single entity 
defenses’. 
182
 According to A. Montesa and A. Givaja, , note 3 above, 571, a parent company may ‘exercise’ its power to 
influence the subsidiary by putting in place appropriate management/controlling mechanisms allowing it to 
control the subsidiary’s market conduct in general, that is to say, at least with regard to its main strategic plans. 
This mechanism could take the form of (a) management teams appointed by the parent company to control the 
subsidiary as in Viho; or (b) the adoption of a coordination role by the parent company reinforced by the 
presence of documents containing express orders for organizing meetings to formulate marketing and pricing 
policies as in Shell. 
183
 Case C-196/99 P, Siderúrgica Aristrain Madrid SL v. European Commission, [2003] ECR I-1105, para. 99: 
The simple fact that the share capital of two separate commercial companies is held by the same person or the 
same family is insufficient, in itself, to establish that those two companies are an economic unit with the result 
that, under Community competition law, the actions of one company can be attributed to the other and that one 
can be held liable to pay a fine for the other. 
184
 French competition law case law made an additional distinction: to the extent that related corporate entities 
hold themselves out as separate competitors, their conduct is not integrated and they therefore do not present a 
single economic entity. See M. Thill-Tayara, ‘Holding on to the “holding out doctrine”: the French approach 
towards intra-group conspiracy’, ECLR 24 (2003), 553-556. This finding goes against P. Areeda’s argument that 
in U.S. antitrust law, holding out should not be a ground for conspiracy attribution, see P. Areeda, note 39 above, 
468 
185
 See among others R. Burnley, note 4 above, 610. 
 36
prosecutorial standpoint, a controlling entity can rebut the presumption(s) of single entity by 
claiming that it presents an actual or potential market competitor.186 From a defensive point of 
view, parties to the proceedings are required to demonstrate that an entity does not determine 
its own commercial policy or acts in other ways as a controlled and non-competing entity. 
According to the Commission, a parent or otherwise controlling company has to adduce 
precise explanations regarding its relationship with controlled entities. Mere general 
assertions of lack of control or influence on conduct do not suffice.187 The EU’s framework 
can be presented in the following way: 
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Control rights and market conduct present themselves as operational conditions to establish or 
rebut single entity status, but their exact interaction and the weight attributed to each of them 
is unclear. To the extent that evidence of ownership rights can be established – and perhaps 
even if control is established without direct or significant references to ownership rights, a 
presumption of integrated market conduct could help both prosecutorial and defensive single 
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entity pleas. “Integrated market conduct” is equally difficult to operationalize. The concept 
contains elements of both entrepreneurial interests and actual or potential competition that 
appear U.S. law. Whereas the U.S. single entity test is not entirely clear either, it at least 
proposes a more nuanced distinction among different arguments, the weight of which is 
uncertain in a general integrated market conduct structure. A full-fledged entrepreneurial 
interest and competitive link test would therefore be more helpful to assess whether two 
controlled entities do not engage in restrictive practices through integrated market conduct. So 
far however, the conduct stage of the EU’s test remains vague and hardly predictable on a 
more general level. 
4. Concluding remarks: prospects for single entity convergence? 
 
The previous sections juxtaposed single entity claims as a matter of competition law in the 
U.S. and the EU. We analyzed how courts in particular developed, explicated or presumed the 
existence of single entities to define the scope of competition law. EU law debates have 
mainly focused on the scope of application or on the prosecutorial dimension of single entity, 
whereas U.S. case law has aimed to integrate single entity analysis more directly into debates 
on the nature of restraints to competition. Following American Needle, the idea of a per se 
rule of single entity has been replaced by a set of (quick look) rebuttable presumptions, 
similar to the approach taken in the EU for much longer. In addition, the EU’s recent 
prosecutorial focus of single entity debates allows to explicate the foundations and conditions 
of single entity in relation to parent – subsidiary relationships and thereby allows more 
analytical clarity in devising an EU single entity test. Emphasis on control and conduct in 
both legal orders allows for a more dynamic and economically oriented inquiry into the scope 
of competition law provisions. 
 
Our aim in this concluding section is not to develop one single transatlantic ‘single entity’ 
test. A workable test defines the necessary and sufficient operational conditions under which 
business behaviour is illegal and assigns the burden of proof.188 These elements necessarily 
relate to particular procedural and evidentiary aspects of a legal system. Claims to design a 
common transatlantic test would therefore disregard particularities that function as the very 
variables of that test in these jurisdictions. Rather than developing a single test, the 
abovementioned juxtaposition of single entity claims in both legal systems nevertheless 
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allows us to develop three reasons as to why further convergence among EU and U.S. single 
entity claims would significantly benefit both legal orders. 
 
First, both EU and U.S. single entity tests are grounded in a general theoretical framework of 
the firm in which control is primarily – but not necessarily – related to ownership and in 
which market conduct presents an important additional variable. Judges’ willingness to assess 
the role attributed to a variety of control rights appears to underlie the scope of both tests. On 
the one hand, both EU and U.S. single entity claims rely on particular notions of control and 
market conduct. The uncertainty and vagueness of any conception of control is apparent in 
both legal regimes. In both systems, specific cases have translated the notion of control into 
control rights based on ownership presumptions, but have left open alternative control 
arrangements to be included in a single entity test. As such, non-ownership related control 
mechanisms would not appear to be inherently excluded from (potential) single entity tests in 
either legal order. On the other, market conduct has been further subdivided into 
entrepreneurial interests and the absence of an actual or potential competitive link in U.S. law 
and could thus provide a more nuanced testing framework for EU law. In addition, the law in 
both systems now attributes (rebuttable) presumptions of integrated market conduct to wholly 
owned subsidiaries and potentially extends that approach to less than wholly owned entities. 
Both tests thus present comparable variables and a comparable framework for judicial 
developments in this field. 
 
Second, the establishment of a single entity test in both legal orders remains a matter of 
judicial lawmaking. In both regimes, a supreme court has the final say on the scope and 
existence of single entity claims. Even though the European Commission can adopt binding 
decisions and impose fines as a matter of EU law, its activities are subject to judicial review. 
In the end however, the Commission has to take stock of the ECJ’s case law on the matter. 
The U.S. remedial mechanisms almost exclusively relies on court decisions. In the same way, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has the final say on legal matters, thus allowing both institutions to 
develop a single entity test. Convergence could thus significantly be facilitated as the scope of 
potential convergence actors can be relegated to two courts already regularly interacting with 
one another.189 
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Third, both legal tests showcase sufficiently different nuances, allowing for beneficial mutual 
enrichment among EU and U.S. lawyers. The ECJ’s more direct reliance on corporate control, 
rather than on ‘absence of separate decision making’ centers provides more certainty in 
delineating a single entity framework. The operationalization of market conduct in interests 
and specific or general market behaviour proves relevant for EU lawyers to consider. At the 
same time, issues related to the scope of ‘absence of actual or potential competition’ or of 
integrated market conduct raise similar questions and demand more attention to market 
definition questions in developing a fully operational single entity test. The scope of that 
inquiry potentially defines the scope of single entity claims and the ensuing policies 
underlying competition law application and enforcement. Finding a generally acceptable 
operational standard in either legal regime might benefit from the analysis of arguments 
elaborated in the other. 
 
The abovementioned reasons indicate that single entity convergence does not remain a distant 
theoretical possibility. As tools for convergence, elements of control and conduct allow to 
refine and substitute current testing frameworks by more detailed structures. More detailed 
and focused interactions among practitioners, scholars and policymakers are necessary to 
generate true convergence. At the very least, the antitrust mindsets on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean have been imbued by thinking in terms of operational conditions and finding a 
workable single entity testing framework. It is now up to judges and practitioners to 
operationalize that framework into more predictable and concrete  single entity tests. As this 
contribution aimed to demonstrate, analyzing U.S. antitrust or EU competition law as an 
inspiration for gap filling can contribute to these operationalization efforts. 
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